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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
GOOD·YEAR TIRE AND RUBBER 
COMPANY, a corporation, and 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND 




THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH and 




Case No. 6;250 
Plaintiffs assail the finding of the Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah, to wit: 
"On the 8th day of May, 1939, while employed 
by the defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 
at Salt Lake City, Utah ,while in the course of his 
duties as helper, applicant sustained accidental in-
jury in the following manner: Being required to 
work overtime the applicant rode a motorcycle owned 
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by the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company to his home 
for dinner and was accidentally injured on the re-
turn trip; the motorcycle became unmanageable, 
left the road and crashed into the side of a private 
residence, badly crushing applicant's left leg below 
the knee; he also sustained contusions of the elbows 
and lower arms." 
They assert that "During the time that employee was 
absent going to his home, his. employment was suspended" 
* * * and that "He was not injured while on duty nor 
in his working hours" * * * This issue raises a ques-
tion of fact that must be determined by an examination of 
the evidence taken before the Commission. Almost invar-
iably in controversies involving liability of the employer to 
the employee, conflicts. in evidence occur. The Commission 
that hears the evidence and sees the witnesses is better able 
than an appellate court to resolve such conflicts. If there is 
evidence that substantially supports the finding of the Com-
mission, this. court will not disturb the ruling of the Com-
mission. Citation of cases to support this proposition is not 
needed. 
Plaintiffs invoke what is commonly called the "going 
and coming" rule which is frequently stated as follows. 
The employee gets up in the morning, dres.ses himself, and 
goes to work because of his employment; yet if he· meets 
with an accident before coming to the employer's pre·mises, 
or his place of work, that is not a risk of his occupation but 
of life generally." The same result obtains generally when 
the employee has completed his shift and leaves the em-
ployer's premises to go to his home, or wherever he pleases, 
in his own way and for his own purposes. With that rule 
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applied to an appropriate sta~e of facts, the defendants have 
no quarrel. 
However, the set of facts in a given cas,e differ so great-
ly from the facts in other cases that the rule cannot be ap-
plied blindly. Each case must be ruled upon its facts. This 
is emphasized by this court in the following case. 
Cuda.hy Packing Company vs. Industrial Commis'Sio11., 
60 Utah 161. 
This was the first "going and coming" case decided by 
this court where a variance from the rule is recognized. 
While the decision now is looked upon as academic, yet at 
the time it was considered quite revolutionary. It later re-
ceived the approval of the Supreme Court of the United 
State. In a private conveyance deceased was traveling along 
a highway toward his place of employment. This highway 
was the only available public way for employees of the ·Cud-
ahy plant to approach the employer's premises. It crossed 
the mainline tracks of two railroads and the court held that 
the risk of these crossings was incidental to the employment, 
and although the employee was killed upon these tracks 
before reaching the place of employment, nevertheless the 
accident was. compensable. In the course of the decision the 
following paragraphs appear: 
"It is not easy and probably not possible or de-
sirable to state any general rule applicable to every 
condition or state of facts by or under which com-
pensation can be allowed or denied to an employee. 
Courts are usually controlled by the peculiar facts of 
each case." 
On rehearing the court again says : 
"We reaffirm the statement in the opinion that 
every case must depend on its own particular facts." 
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CITATIO·N OF CASES 
Before stating the evidence upon which the Industrial 
Commission based its ruling that the injury in question arose 
out of or in the course of the employment, we respectfully 
call to the court's attention a few illustrative cases taken 
from the great number of well-considered cases in which 
Supreme Courts have held against the contention that the 
going and coming rule applied and have given compensation 
where the purpose, spirit and liberal construction of the 
workmens' compensation law, applied to the particular facts 
in the case, justify granting compensation, altho the hard 
letter of the rule would seem to shut off that right. 
Tex·as Indemnity Ins. Co. vs. Clark (Texas) 50 So. W. 
(2nd) 465. 
Claimant was. one of a gang of employees of the Prairie 
Pipe Line Company engaged in repairing leaks in the pipe-
line. On January 11, work was completed in Palo Pinto 
County and the gang, with the exception of claimant, were 
transferred to Jack County for work next day. Applicant 
and two others were ordered, or permitted as variously 
stated, to remain in Mineral Springs, Palo Pinto County, 
until morning when they were to report for work in Jack 
County. Applicant left Mineral Springs early in the morn-
ing of January 12 for Jack County and proceeded to search 
for lodgings. No camp facilities were furnished by employer. 
While in a private auto searching for a lodging place, appli-
cant was injured in a collision on a public street. The gang 
went to work at 7 :00 as usual the morning of the 12th. Ap-
plicant did not work at all that day. Injury occurred after 
the noon meal. 
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In holding injury compensable it is stated: 
"We think a jury could reasonably conclude 
under such circumstances that Clark's act in secur-
ing necessary rooming place was incidental to and 
in furtherance of his duty as an employee of the 
company." * * * 
Hobson vs. Dept. of Labor & Indtustries (Wash.) 27 
Pac. (2nd) 1091. 
Deceased was engaged as watchman or repairman by 
Greenwood Logging ·Company, which had suspended opera-
tion. His work was 24 hours each day. On the occasion of 
his death he had gone on a gasoline propelled speeder owned 
and furnished by the employer, to a point some miles dis-
tant to secure groceries, for his own use and which were 
purchased at his own expense. Objection to an award was 
on the ground that he was on an errand of his own and not 
for his employer. 
In holding that he was killed in the course of his employ-
ment the Supreme ~Court says: 
"The action of Hobson, procuring food supplies, 
was necessary to the proper performance of his work 
and constituted no interruption of the course of his 
employment (24 hours per day as watchman and 
general repairman). Hence Hobson was engaged in 
the furtherance of the interests of his employer at 
the time of the fatal accident. He was killed while in 
the course of his employment, therefore his widow 
is entitled to compensation." 
Mackay vs. Dept. of Labor and Industries (Wash.) 44 
Pac. (2nd) 793. 
·claimant was employed with his caterpillar by the hour 
in road construction. While working his caterpillar broke 
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down and he stopped work and took the broken parts some 
distance to a garage for repairs. While at the garage he was 
injured. The Supreme Court granted compensation. 
"The caterpillar became disabled on the job. 
The job was not done. The claimant did the natural 
thing in taking the disabled part at ,once to the near-
est place where it could be repaired to enable him, 
as speedily as possible, to do the work for which he 
was hired. We think this was incidental to his em-
ployment even though the aggregate amount of his 
pay was to be determined by the time during which 
the machine was in operation." 
The court quotes with approval the following language 
from an earlier Washington case. 
"This court is committed to the doctrine that 
our Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally 
construed in favor of its beneficiaries. It is a humane 
law and founded upon sound public policy and is the 
result of thoughtful painstaking and humane con-
siderations and its beneficient provisions should not 
be limited or curtailed by a narrow construction." 
Michaux, et al. vs. Gate City Orange, etc. Co. (N. C.) 
172 So. E. 406. 
Deceased, 16 years of age, employed as assistant to the 
truck driver. On day in question the truck stopped to make 
a delivery and while the truck was standing still deceased 
and another negro boy engaged in a fuss about an Eskimo 
pie. The driver of the truck started off without him when 
the deceased ran after it, caught the truck and in attempting 
to climb on it fell and sustained the injury causing his death. 
Held by the Industrial Commission that "deceased suffered 
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an accident that arose out of and in the course of his em-
ployment." 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina ignores the fact 
that he had left his employment for purposes of his. own and 
that fact was the occasion of his injury. It occurred during 
his working time and therefore was compensable. 
Gilmore vs. Ring Const. Co. (Mo.) 61 So. W. (2nd) 764. 
Complainant was employed by the construction com-
pany to pour concrete. The work depending upon weather 
conditions it was the custom for the men to report afiout 
7 :30 a. m. for work and if conditions were not right the men 
would often wait around the job at the request of the fore-
man until it would be ascertained as to whether conditions 
changed for the better. It was a custom to have a fire around 
which the men would assemble for comfort while waiting. 
On the morning in question claimant reported at 7 :30 a. m. 
and was told weather conditions were not then right and the 
foreman told him to wait around to see if weather conditions 
would get better. The men were discussing in jocular mood 
about some men working Saturday forenoon in violation of 
a union rule. As a result of some remark by complainant one 
of the other men grabbed him and shoved him and he fell 
and broke his leg. 
The court of appeals held that he was an employee; that 
he had reported for work in conformity with the conditions 
under which the work was being done. His foreman had 
told him to wait around. He was as. much in his line of duty 
as he would have been if pouring cement. 
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"We conclude from the undisputed facts in evi-
dence in this case that as a matter of law it should 
be held that the accident wherein the complainant 
was injured arose out of and in the course of his 
employment." 
Industrial Commission vs. Murphy! (Ohio) 197 No. 
East. 505. 
Applicant was employed by an undertaking establish-
ment. His work was. around the funeral home and occasion-
ally he was required to go to hospitals or homes for his em-
ployer. He lived a distance from his place of employment 
and was by the terms of his employment required at all 
times to hold himself in readiness for a call for immediate 
service. His employer must be kept informed day and night 
of his whereabouts and immediately upon call he was to re-
port to his place of employment. There were no regular 
hours of employment. On the day of the injury at 6:00a.m. 
he received a call that he was wanted and to come in a hurry. 
He drank a cup of coffee, went to get a street car, which 
was his ordinary method of travel, and there was injured. 
It was contended his actual employment did not commence 
until he reached the funeral home which was the fact and 
the "going and coming" rule was invoked. 
The Supreme ·Court in granting compensation said: 
"We conclude therefore that the defendant in 
error was injured during and by reason of his em· 
ployment." 
Chandler vs. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213. 
"The beneficent purposes of such acts (Work· 
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mens Compensation) are apparent to all and for that 
reason if for no other should receive a very liberal 
construction in favor of the injured employee. We 
are all united on the proposition that in view of the 
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the ·employee or of his 
dependents as the case may be.'' 
The foregoing was written by this Supreme Court in a 
case where a delivery man, in the morning, on his way to 
his employer's place of business to start his day's work, de-
livered a package of meat left from the day before. The de-
fense set up in this case by the insurance company was the 
"going and coming" rule. 
Twin Peaks C. Co·. vs. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 
589. 
During an interval of leisure the employee in this case 
was playing with an elevator. The power was shut off to 
tease another boy and leave him stalled between floors. In 
turning on the power the deceased was· killed. During all 
the time the deceased was so playing the particular machine 
on which he was employed was inactive. This court awarded 
compensation for his death and while this is not a "going and 
coming" case some of the statements made by the court are 
quite applicable in the case at bar. 
"A careful reading of the decided case will, how-
. ever, disclose that the mere fact that the injured 
employee was not in the discharge of his usual duties 
or was not directly engaged in anything connected 
with those duties, does not necessarily prevent him 
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from recovering compensation in case of accidental 
injury. In that connection it must be remembered 
that, while a human being may do no more than what 
a machine might do, yet he cannot be classed as a 
machine merely." 
"While, therefore, in view of all the circum-
stances in this case, there may be some reason for 
reasonable minds to differ with respect to whether 
the accident in question arose out of the employment, 
yet, in view that we are required to construe the act 
liberally and with a view to effectuating its purpose, 
and so as to protect the unfortunate employee, and, 
in case -of his death, those who are dependent on him 
for support, we feel constrained to hold that the acci-
dent in question arose in the course of the employ-
ment." 
Utah Apex Mng. Co·. vs. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 
537. 
While this is not a "going and coming" case the injury 
in question occurred after working hours and issue was 
raised as to whether or not it arose out of the employment. 
The court approves the following definitions: 
"The expressions 'arising out of' and 'in the 
course of' the employment are not synomynous; but 
the words 'arising out of' are construed to refer to 
the origin or cause of the injury, and the words 'in 
the course of' to refer to the time, place and circum-
stances under which it occurred. An injury which 
occurs in the course of the employment will ordi-
narily but not necessarily, arise out of it, while an 
injury arising out of an employment almost neces-
sarily occurs in the course of it." 
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EVIDENCE UPON WHICH. THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION BASED ITS HOLDING THAT T'HE INJURY 
AROSE OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE O,F T'HE 
EMPLOYMENT. 
In stating the evidence upon which the Commission 
based its holding we are mindful of the admonition written 
by Judge Thurman in the cas.e last above cited: 
"It is an established rule in this jurisdiction, 
based upon mandatory statute, that on writ of re-
view, the court will not disturb the Commission's 
findings if there is any substantial evidence to sus-
tain them. Further, that the court will not review 
the evidence and pass upon its weight. So that it is 
love's labor lost and time wasted for counsel, in 
argument, to devote time and space in discussing 
evidence in conflict with the evidence upon which 
the award was made." 
Applicant, 19 years old, was in the employ of the de-
fendant tire company on the day in question. He worked 
as an extra man in the service department, which included 
the lubrication department and the actual mounting of tires 
(Tr. 1, p. 26). His regular hours ·were from nine o'clock 
a. m. to six o'clock p. m., with a lunch hour off at noon. The 
injury occurred on the sixth day of his employment. On 
previous days he finished the day's work around 6 :30 p. m. 
His wages were $2.50 per day. (Tr. 1, p. 20.) On the day of 
the injury he was required to stay on for extra work contin-
uing directly from the end of his regular shift. At the out-
set the length of the overtime was estimated by the foreman 
at four hours. Which would mean untillO :00 or 10 :30 p. m. 
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Evidently the job lengthened as time went on. Nothing was 
said about an opportunity to eat until about 8:00 o'clock. 
At that time applicant was loosening bolts on the wheels of 
a truck and delay had occurred in procuring new tires. from 
the wholesale house. The job was temporarily held up. Mr. 
Schneider, the boss, told applicant and the other workmen 
to go to supper. Applicant said he would go as soon as he 
loosened the bolts and nuts on the rear wheels. {Applicant 
Tr. 1, p. 4 and 14. Grover Tr. 2, p. 3-5 and 12. Costly Tr. 
2, p. 14.) Mr. Schneider .and the other two employees went 
away. Nothing was. said to applicant to the effect that he 
should wait at the garage until Schneider returned. (Tr. 
1, p. 49.) 
Applicant finished loosening the bolts and nuts on the 
wheels. Then he talked with Mr. Fox who was in charge of 
the lubricating department and who was the only other em-
ployee of the tire company then in the service department 
and under whom applicant worked part of the time. He 
asked Mr. Fox about using the motorcycle for going home. 
Mr. Fox said his car was on the grease rack and then ap-
plicant went to the motorcycle which was on the open court 
as usual. Mr. Fox asked him if he was going to use the mo-
torcycle and he answered yes. He had trouble starting the 
motor and one of the ooys in the gas station department 
helped him start it and he went home. It was then about 
8:15 p. m. (T·r. 1, pages 4 and 10.) The motorcycle 'vas 
the only means applicant had of getting home. (Tr. 1, p. 
15.) 
The motorcycle was owned by the defendant tire com-
pany, was kept on the open court of the service station 
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where all employees had access to it, and was, as a matter 
of fact, used by several of the employees of the service de-
partments. No one states how many of employees actually 
used it. No where in the record is it shown that this appli-
cant was told not to· use it. Applicant had been encouraged 
by a regular employee to learn to use it, and this. employee, 
Mr. Fox, in charge of the lubricating department, had taken 
applicant out two times on the motorcycle to show him how 
to use it and applicant had taken it out twice by himself 
and had once ridden it around in the open court of the ser-
vice station in plain view of every person there at the time. 
(Tr. 1, p. 6.) All this occurred in the course of six days. 
(Tr. 1, p. 5.) These circumstances are sufficient to charge 
Mr. Schneider, the man in charge of the service department, 
with knowledge that applicant was using the motorcycle. 
However, that need not be left to conjecture. On one occa-
sion, two days before the injury, Mr. Schneider actually 
talked to applicant about riding the motorcycle. (Tr. 1, 
pages 8 and 12.) Mr. Schneider on that occasion told ap-
plicant to make a delivery on the motorcycle. 
Applicant, on the motorcycle, went directly to his home. 
When he stopped in the driveway of his home his younger 
sister came out and asked him to give her a ride-she 
climbed on the tool box and applicant drove her around one 
block. Applicant estimates the time consumed by the sister's 
ride as three minutes. (Tr. 2, page 18 and 22.) No street 
was crossed on the trip. From the time applicant first drove 
into the driveway and pulled out after eating his dinner was 
about ten minutes. (Tr. 2, p. 20.) His dinner was. on a 
plate in the warming oven when he reached home. He ate 
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"a few bites" and started back for the garage and was in-
jured a short distance from his home. 
Applicant had trouble with the motorcycle from the 
time he started the machine. It went to the left of the road 
all the time. He came upon a parked car facing east on the 
south side of the road and he could not turn the motorcycle 
to the right, so he turned it to the left as sharp as he could 
but still hit the fender of the parked car, then he lost control 
of the motorcycle and it ran into the corner of a house. (Tr. 
1, p. 4.) 
In order that there may be no question that applicant 
was not dismissed at the time of the injury and that Mr. 
Schneider declined to say that applicant was not in line of 
his duty in going home to get dinner, we reproduce the fol-
lowing questions put by Commissioner Jugler and answers 
thereto by Mr. Schneider. (T·r. 1, pages 37 and 38.): 
Q. Mr. Harris' usual duties were nine in the 
morning to six in the evening? 
A. Yes, that is when we bring the extra man 
on to work. 
Q. His wages during that period were two and a 
half a day? 
A. I don't know what his wages were. I know 
when I started there almost three years ago that is 
what I was paid. We never saw each others checks. 
Q. They paid additional for over time? 
A. They paid the extra man by the hours. 
Q. Mr. Harris' duties on this particular day 
would not be complete until the wheels of the trucks 
were changed : 
A. That is right. 
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Q. His work was not completed at the time of 
the accident? 
A. No, it was not. 
Q. Did it ever happen that a man has left a 
job and gone to eat without specific instructions and 
come back and completed his work: 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. They stay through until they are told to go 
and eat? 
A. They must stay until the work is done or 
they are instructed to have lunch and if the work 
is not done to come back and finish. 
Q. Was Mr. Harris in the line of duty going 
home to get dinner ? 
MR. DAY: I object to that as a conclusion. 
COM. JUGLER: He is a boss? 
A. There were no errands for the institution 
for Mr. Harris to run at that time. 
Q. I beg your pardon ? 
A. There were no deliveries or errands for the 
company at that time. 
Q. His work was on the truck to complete this 
job on the truck? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And his day was not over until that job 
was complete? 
A. Yes, or so we could handle it, but he was 
supposed to be on the job. 
Q. He was not dismissed ? 
A. No, not by instructions. 
As near as can be determined from all the evidence the 
injury was received by applicant very close to 8:30 p. m., 
May 8, 1939. At the time of the first hearing before the In-
dustrial Commission, July 20, 1939, no pay had been given 
applicant for his work on May 8th. (Tr. 1, p. 20.) ·Com-
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missioner Jugler requested Mr. Schneider who was in charge 
of the station that night to file a copy of the time sheet for 
that day. (Tr. 1, p. 41.) There is in the record a letter dated 
July 20th and marked received by the Industrial Commission 
July 22d, (Item 7 of the record) which this court will note 
is two and _one-half months after the date 'Of the injury and 
two days after the completion of the first hearing, attached 
to which is what purports. to be applicant's time sheet for 
that day. 
This time sheet besides being "a receipt in full for all 
compensation or otherwise" apparently shows that $3.28 
is. due applicant for ten and. one-half hours-from "5-7 to 
5-13-1939." Presumably the ten and one-half hours is for the 
regular shift up to six or 6 :30 o'clock, and two and one-half 
hours overtime thereafter on May 8, 1939. Mr. Schneider 
whose duty it was to turn in applicant's time and who was 
in charge of the garage that night, said he returned to the 
garage about "8 :30 or 9 :00. They told me that Mr. H:arris 
had wrecked the motorcycle and they told me where it was." 
('T·r. 1, p. 33.) 
From this time sheet it is apparent that applicant's 
employers ·attempted to stop his overtime not when he was 
sent out to eat but as near as they could fix it at the very 
instant of the injury. In other words he was in the course 
of his employment when he left the garage on the motorcycle, 
while he ate "a few bites," while he started back and while 
he ·traveled back toward the garage and up to the very in-
stant of the injury. At that instant he was on his own time 
and no longer in the course of his employment. 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR RULING ON MOOT CASE 
Plaintiffs seem disturbed about whether or not the tire 
company would be liable in damages if applicant while going 
home or returning to the garage that night had caused dam-
age to person or property. ( pp. 2·6-27 -28-29 plaintiff's 
brief.) They ask the advice of the Supreme Court upon this 
question. Their own witness testified in answer to Mr. Day's 
question that there was no damage to the house that was 
struck by the motorcycle, (Tr. 3, p. 6) and there is not a 
suggestion in the record or at all that any damage was 
caused to any person or property, except to the applicant 
and to the motorcycle. 
In advance of a case filed the Supreme c·ourt is asked 
how it would rule if a case were filed. 
EVIDENCE OF PERMANENCE OF INJURY 
August 10, 1939, after the first hearing in the case, and 
three monthes after the injury, the Industrial Commission 
rendered its decision in which it found: 
"The applicant required medical and hospital 
service and treatment and was disabled from work 
for a period of time; he now suffers some permanent 
partial loss of the use of his left leg below the knee 
as a result of the injury of May 8, 1939." 
July 20, 1939-first hearing. 
Dec. 13, 1939-first re-hearing. 
March 4, 1940-second re-hearing. 
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On each occasion applicant appeared in person before 
the Commission and on the first two occasions testified 
orally. 
May 27, 1940, the Industrial ·Commission, after two re-
hearings at the request of plaintiff, adopted the following 
resolution after reciting the three hearings. and the decision 
of August 10, 1939: 
"Now, therefore, be it resolved and ordered that 
the Commission's decision of August 10, 1939, be and 
the same is hereby reaffirmed and approved as the 
Commission's decision herein." 
The record also shows that on May 19, 1939, Dr. e. L. 
Shields, attending physician, reported that applicant suf-
fered: 
also 
"Compound comminuted fracture of left tibia 
and fibula with three lacerations where bone pro-
truded through the skin into the dirt. Dislocation of 
the ankle joint and marked destruction and tearing 
of tissues on the extensor surface" ; 
"After thorough cleansing bones well approxi-
mated and held in place with Thomas splint. This 
caused so much s·welling and pain in foot that leg was 
placed in Zizner frame and held in place by weight 
and Kirschner wire thru tibia and fibula." 
The hospital bills filed with the ,Commission showing 
the length of the various periods applicant remained in hos-
pital were also before the ·Commission. 
In view of Section 42-1-82 of the Revised Statutes, 1933, 
this record of the injury and the commission's opportunity to 
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see the applicant on several occasions certainly furnishes 
ample bases for a finding by the Commission on August 
10, 1939, and its affirmance on May 27, 1940 that applicant 
"now suffers some permanent partial loss of the use of his 
left leg below the knee." 
Section 42-1-82 expressly provides that "The Commis-
sion shall not be bound by the usual common-law or statutory 
rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules of pro-
cedure other than as herein provided;" 
The powers of the Industrial Commission are continu-
ing (Revised Statutes, 1933, Section 42-1-72) and changed 
conditions may be investigated at any time and the amount 
of compensation changed accordingly. Even the annulment 
of this award because of inadequate evidence of the extent 
or permanence of disability would not prevent the Commis-
sion taking further evidence and fixing the· amount of com-
pensation. 
McGary vs. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 5·92. 
State Road Commission vs. Industria-l Commis-
siorn, S6 Utah 252;. 
Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 61 
Utah 514. 
CONCLUSION1 
No question of jurisdiction arises in this case. In every 
detail the award is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. F'or the reasons given we respectfully submit that 
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the award of the Industrial Commission of Utah to Lee 






Attorney General of the State of 
Utah, Attorney for the Industrial 
Commissi·on of the State of Utah. 
LOOFBOUROW AND REICHMAN, 
Attorneys forr Lee James Harris, 
De I endJfunts. 
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